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Abstract
The emergence  in the 1990s of a nascent project bond  Much of the recent work relating to the role of
market to  fund long-term  infrastructure  projects in  contractual  covenants  to the determination of bond
developing countries merits attention.  Dailami  and  prices has focused  on the U.S.  corporate bond market
Hauswald compile  .tailed  information  on a sample of  with its unique bankruptcy code  (Chapter  11)  and well
105 bonds  issued between January  1993  and March  developed  legal framework,  recognizing  the bond
2002 for financing infr  -- 'lcrr..  projects  in developing  contract as the  sole instrument of defining the rights and
countries, document  their contractual  covenants, and  duties of various parties. In circumstances  in which  the
analyze  their pricing determinants.  They find that on  underpinning legal  and institutional  frameworks
average,  project bonds are issued at approximately  300  governing  contract formation and enforcement  are not
basis points above  U.S. Treasury  securities, have a  well developed,  the link between  bond  pricing and legal
surprisingly  high issue size of US$278  million, a maturity  framework  becomes important.  This finding is confirmed
of slightly under  12 years,  and are rated  slightly below  by the authors'  econometric  analysis of project bond
investment grade.  In terms of geographic  origin, projects  pricing model. So, investors  take into account the quality
in Asia and Latin America have  issued more bonds than  of the host country's legal framework  and reward
those  located  in other regions.  projects located  in countries that adhere to the rule of
law with tighter credit spreads and lower funding costs.
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The emergence in the  1990s of a nascent project bond market to fund long-term infrastructure
projects in  developing countries merits attention. This paper complies detail information on  a
sample of 105 bonds issued between January 1993 and March 2002 forfinancing infrastructure
projects in developing, documents their  contractual covenants ,and  analyses their  pricing  de-
terminants. It is found that on  average, project bonds are issued at approximately 300 basis
points above US Treasury  securities, have a surprisingly  high issue size of US$278 million, a ma-
turity of slightly under 12 years and are rated slightly below investment grade .In terms of geo-
graphic origin, projects in Latin America and Asia have issued more bonds than those located in
other regions.
Much of the recent work relating  the role of contractual  covenants to the determination  of
bond prices has  focused on the  US corporate bond market  with unique bankruptcy code ( Chap-
ter 11)  and well developed  legalframework,  recognizing the bond contract as the sole instru-
ment of defining the rights and duties of various  parties. In circumstances in which the underpin-
ning legal and institutional  frameworks governing contract  formation and enforcement are not
well developed,  the link between bond pricing and legalframework becomes important, a finding
confirmed by our econometric analysis ofproject bond pricing model. Hence,  investors take into
account the quality of host country legal framework  and reward projects located in host coun-
tries that adhere to the rule of law with tighter  credit spreads and lowerfunding costs
IEmerging Project Bond Market:
Covenant Provisions and Credit Spreads
I.  Introduction
The emergence in the 1990s of a nascent project bond market to fund long-term infrastructure  pro-
jects in developing countries, such as electric power plants, roads, ports, airports, telecommunica-
tions networks,  and  water  and waste water  facilities,  merits attention  for  several  reasons.  First,
they highlight  the  attractiveness  of such investment  opportunities  that  are  traditionally the  pre-
serve  of the  public sector  for private sources  of capital.  Second,  project bonds  are potentially  a
major source of long-term  private  debt capital  linked directly to  economic  growth  and competi-
tiveness.  Third, they are a new  asset class in the emerging  market debt spectrum,  offering  asset
diversification  and investment opportunities  particularly to  institutional investors,  such as insur-
ance  companies  and pension  funds whose  long-term  liabilities match the long-term  tenor of pro-
ject bonds.  Finally, they mirror the shift in the pattern of capital flows from bank loans to publicly
issued bonds.'
Although  the  volume  of capital  raised  through international  project  bonds remains  rela-
tively small,  the market has gained maturity in a very short time span,  delivering  a series of high
profile transactions  such as US$1.2 billion issued by the Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural  Gas project
in Qatar, US$1 billion issued by the Petrozuata heavy oil project in Venezuela,2 and US$125 mil-
lion  issued by the  Quezon  power project  in  the Philippines.  Today,  the  market  encompasses  a
broad  range of project  types,  issue  sizes,  seniorities,  and maturities.  The total  issuance  volume
worldwide has been on the order of US$25 billion (2000-2001)  of which about one third is attrib-
uted to bonds  issued  by projects  located in  developing  countries.  The  market's  long-term  pros-
pects, driven by the massive infrastructure needs in developing countries,  look very promising.
For more  on global capital  flows  see the  World Bank Global Development Finance  2003; capital  flows to infra-
structure development are discussed in Dailami and Leipziger (1998).
2 See Dailami and Hauswald (2001)  for an in-depth analysis of the Ras Laffan project and the  role that international
bond finance played  in its successful design and completion. Esty (1999) describes the Petrozuata project,  a heavy-
crude oil project in Venezuela  that provides a complementary example to Dailami and Hauswald (2001)  and shows
how international bond finance  could be accessed despite complex legal,  contractual,  and political  risks.
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This note examines  the emergence  and growth of this market as  a new asset class within
the  emerging-market  debt spectrum.  The evolution  of project bonds  is benchmarked  against the
more established fixed income markets in terms of pricing (at-issue spreads) as well as legal struc-
tures and covenant provisions.  An examination of a sample of such bonds issued between January
1993  and  March  2002  reveals  that  project  indentures  contain  the  standard  covenant  provisions
aimed  at  mitigating  conflicts  of interest  between  bondholders  and  shareholders  that  manifest
themselves  through  asset  substitution,  dividend  policies,  claim  dilution,  and  under  investment
(Wamer and Smith  1997). In addition, project-bond  indentures contain clauses that serve as com-
mitment and incentive devices for host governments  and other contracting parties to the project.
In terms of borrowing cost, we find that project bonds are priced at a considerable markup
(average  300bps spread) over comparable US Treasury securities,  but with a high degree of varia-
tion across bonds that depends on project-specific characteristics,  bond features, and the quality of
host-countries'  legal institutions  in determining  investor rights and the degree of their protection.
However,  the preceding graph also shows that project bonds, despite wide variations in number of
3issues  and  their  size,  have  consistently  carried  issue  yields below  comparable  emerging-market
sovereign yields (JP Morgan's EMBI Global Index).  Two factors  are at work. First and foremost,
only the most creditworthy projects can tap the markets and, therefore,  often carry a comparatively
higher credit rating. Second, issuers take particular care in designing their projects'  organizational,
legal, and financial structure when they wish to fund them in public debt markets.  Taken together,
both  forces  suggest  that  the  at-issue  spread  evolution  depicted  above  is  largely  due  to  self-
selection  by borrowers:  only  high-quality  and  well-designed  projects  and their  bonds  come  to
market which then carry credit ratings and issue-yields  below a much larger and  diverse group of
sovereign borrowers.
This note is organized  as  follows. We next discuss the key economic and  financial issues
in the international  project-bond market before turning to the legal design of typical project bonds
in Section Im.  Section IV summarizes our analysis of credit-spread determinants  that highlight the
importance of the ambient institutional development, and Section V concludes.
II. Key Characteristics of the Project-Bond Market
Access  to the  international  bond markets  by infrastructure  projects  in  emerging  economies  is a
relatively  new phenomenon,  borne of the economic reforms,  market liberalization,  and financial
innovations in the early 1990s.  The world-wide  move towards private participation  in infrastruc-
ture (PPI) schemes that gained momentum in the early 1  990s brought about fundamental  changes
in the traditional fiscal  financing of infrastructure  facilities.3 It also ushered in structural changes
in the way in which infrastructure was operated and managed  as a pre-requisite for successful pri-
vate  funding  or projects.  For  instance,  the  development  of structured  credit  techniques,  most
prominently  limited  recourse  project  financing  methods,  along  with  various  risk  sharing  and
hedge devices  (multilateral and export  credit agencies (ECA) guarantees,  private political risk in-
surance),  were instrumental  in containing projects' credit risk sufficiently to make them of interest
to bond  investors.  At the  same time,  privatization,  market liberalization,  and regulatory reforms
created  an economic  environment that could provide private investors  with return potentials  that
could  justify  the  considerable  risks  associated  with  debt  investments  in  emerging  market
infrastructure.
3 Brealey,  Cooper and Habib (1996)  contains an excellent survey of the economic issues involved in project finance.
4An  important factor  contributing to  investor  interest has  been the creative  design of the
debt securities'  legal structures  such  as indenture,  trust  structure,  selective  guarantees,  and cove-
nant provisions  to mitigate  risks  and  provide  contractual  protection  to bond  holders.  Financial
economists have  long recognized the adverse incentives that debt finance'provides  to shareholders
and managers  and the agency costs that those entail.  Smith and Warner (1979) discuss how bond
covenants  typically  attempt  to  address  various  conflicts  of interest between  different  classes  of
claim holders while Green (1984)  and  John (1987)  forrnally analyze  the incentives that leverage
creates  for shareholders  (project  sponsors) to  enhance  their  own returns  by shifting  risk to  deb-
tholders through project attribute selection.
While most project bonds are  corporate bonds, the reverse  is not true. There  are subtle fi-
nancial,  economic,  and  analytical  differences  between the two  segments that merit further atten-
tion  in the  context  of an institutional  analysis  of the  market.  The  dissimilarities  primarily  stem
from the underlying economics  of the borrower.  In the case of a project,  the issuer raises funds to
finance  a single  indivisible large-scale  capital  investment project whose  cash  flows  are  the sole
source to  meet financial  obligations  and to provide returns to investors.4 In the case of a typical
corporate  borrower, the security is typically issued against the firm's general credit and the under-
lying assets  consist of multiple sources of cash flows.  Hence,  typical corporate bonds are secured
by all the  firm's various  assets  and cash flows that offer in themselves risk diversification  and an
important cross-insurance  mechanism.  If a certain set of cash flows becomes unavailable  for debt
service,  firms typically have other sources of cash that might tide the issuer over the liquidity cri-
sis.
No such cross-insurance exists in the case of project bonds: the moment the single source
of cash flows ceases to exist, the issuer experiences  a liquidity crisis that might force it to default
on its bonds.  In addition, projects  suffer from asset-specificity  (location and/or use of the assets),
often ill-defined or ill-enforced  property rights, and bilateral monopoly settings  (dominant output
buyer) that render them vulnerable to opportunistic behavior and unilateral  contract  renegotiation.
Indeed, such opportunistic  behavior coupled with shortcomings  in the ambient  legal institutions is
often at the root of project's economic distress and, ultimately, financial distress.
4 On the other hand, the single  source of cash flows and limited  number of contractual  relations  facilitated the analy-
sis of project bonds.
5These  often  overlooked,  but  crucial  differences  between  project  and  general  corporate
bonds subtly affect investors'  risk perceptions,  the pricing of the bonds,  and their legal structure.
In particular,  investors do not tend to view the underlying  assets as "true security"  even if they are
pledged as such, but take into account and price factors,  such as the creditworthiness of off-takers,
third-party guarantees,  the legal  and institutional  environment,  and, ultimately,  the quality of the
cash  flows.  Put differently,  investors in project bonds  are much more cash-flow  quality oriented
than buyers of typical corporate bonds and tend to price factors that determine the underlying eco-
nomics  of the project.  However,  since  projects  and  their  securities  demand much  more  careful
analysis of the issuer's economic and legal structures, buyers of project bonds are mostly sophisti-
cated institutional investors that have the requisite analytical expertise, rather than retail investors.
In  order  to  document  current  trends  and best practices  in the  international  project-bond
market,  we  collected  a representative  sample  of 105  emerging  market project  bonds issued  be-
tween January 1993 and March 2002. The issue information that we cross-checked with other data
sources comes mainly from Bloomberg  and Interactive Data Corporation (IDC). If the spread-at-
issue over comparable  US  Treasury securities  is not provided, we calculate it from the bond's  is-
sue yield and the yield of an interpolated maturity-matched  Treasury security.  Bond prospectuses
and ratings studies  from Moody's  and Standard & Poors provide the necessary information on the
projects'  contractual structure,  its off-take  (output supply)  agreement,  the bond covenant,  and le-
gal terms and conditions.
Table 6  in the Appendix  lists all our bonds by country  and provides  specific  information
on the  terms  and structure  of each issue.  Our sample  reflects  a broad cross-section  of countries,
project  types,  and  sectors.  International  project bonds  differ widely in their issue  size, maturity,
issue spread, host country sovereign spread, underlying project structure,  legal characteristics,  and
covenants.  Issue  size  ranges  from  US$23  million  (LIGHT,  Brazil)  to  US$1  billion  (Kowloon-
Canton  Railway  Corp.,  China,  and Pemex Mexico)  their  rating  by Moody's  from  AAA  to  B2,
their maturity from less than three years (Transportadora  de gas del Sur,  Argentina)  to  100 years
(albeit callable after 30 years), and the yield at issue over US Treasuries  from 10 basis points for a
convertible bond by a Chinese issuer to 802 basis points for a South-African one.  The following
table summarizes  typical characteristics of project bonds on the basis of our sample.
6Characteristics  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Spread over US Treasuries  297.80  173.81  10  802.17
Amount  278.07  201.62  23  1000
Maturity (years)  11.82  10.50  2.97  100
Rating classification (average of Moody's and S&P)  BBB/BBB-  3 notches  B  AAA
Based on a sample of 105 infrastructure-related, US dollar-denominated international  bonds is-
sued by projects in  20 emerging economies  (Argentina, Brazil,  Chile,  China, Colombia, Czech
Rep.,  Dominican Rep.,  Hong Kong,  India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,  Panama, Philippines,
Qatar, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, and Venezuela).
On average,  emerging-economy project bonds are issued at approximately 300 basis points
above  US  Treasury  securities  of comparable  maturities,  have  a  surprisingly  high  issue  size  of
US$278  million,  a maturity of just under  12  years  and are rated  slightly below investment  grade
(exactly between BBB- and BBB). Most project bonds  are senior debt or issued against  a  collec-
tion of project receivables  as asset-backed  securities (ABS).  The latter type of debt, while not ex-
plicitly senior obligations of the project,  are issued as pari  passu instruments that will become de
facto senior once other unsubordinated debt comes into existence.
Unsecured  debt tends to be rated higher than secured debt, possibly reflecting the fact that
higher  rated projects  can afford to provide less security to their  investors.  In  terms of geographic
origin,  intemational  project  bonds  from Latin America  and  Asia  are  more numerous  than  from
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. All major project types are represented  albeit with a
particular concentration of issues in  the energy, power, telecom, and transport sectors.
III.  Covenant Provisions
A  fruitful  conceptual  framework  for analyzing  projects  and,  in  particular,  their  organizational,
contractual, and  financial  design  relies on the view of the firm as  a nexus of contracts.  First for-
mulated in  the seminal papers by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), it
underlies much of modem  corporate finance.  The allocation of control rights and interaction of all
constituent  contracts  of a  firm  (infrastructure  project)  motivate  financing  choices  (Fama,  1990),
determine  corporate  governance  arrangements  (Jensen  and Meckling,  1976),  and even provide  a
framework for project valuation (see Kaplan and Ruback,  1995  for an application  in  terms of dis-
counted  cash flows).  Hence,  we would expect  bond covenants  of projects  that, by their very na-
ture, most closely correspond to the stylized view of the firm as a nexus of contracts, to reflect and
7address conflicts  of interests not only between  different  claimholders  but also other stakeholders,
such as host governments  and customers, in the project.
Projects  suffer  from  typical  contracting  problems  arising  from  relationship  specificity,
sunk costs,  and the associated  "hold-up"  problem that were  first described  in other areas of eco-
nomics  by Klein,  Crawford,  and  Alchian  (1978),  and  Williamson  (1979,  1983).  Three  types of
solutions have  been proposed in the literature  that balance incentives for ex-ante efficient  invest-
ments and ex-post trade efficient:  (i) writing contracts with proper legal remedies in case of breach
of contract (Shavell,  1980 and  1984; Rogerson,  1984), (ii) agreeing on a rule for the re-negotiation
of contracts (Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey,  1994), and (iii) writing option contracts (Noldeke and
Schmidt,  1995).  In  addition, the parties  can  always  attempt to write  a self-enforcing  contract  so
that,  as  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976)  have  argued,  conflicts  of interest between  bondholder  and
stockholder are resolved through the contractual and financial design of firms. This insight under-
lies  much  of our analysis of project bond  covenants  that we  can take  to be  the  contractual  re-
sponses to the afore-mentioned contracting problems.
Since the presence of risky debt in a firm's capital structure  can lead to expost conflicts of
interests  between  the firn's  equity holders  and  bondholders,  contractual  devices  such  as  debt
covenants have evolved to mitigate their adverse consequences.  For instance, companies that issue
bonds either on a project (non-recourse) or corporate (on-balance sheet) basis,  be it in domestic or
in international markets, generally agree to a set of contractual covenants requiring them to take or
to refrain  from taking certain specified actions. Such actions are designed fundamentally to protect
the interest of bondholders-safety  and seniority of their claims, repayment, and legal remedies in
the  event of default-after  the bonds have  been  issued.  Covenant provisions  contained  in bond
indentures  typically take the  form of restrictions  on dividend,  M&A  transactions,  and  asset dis-
posals, limitations  on indebtedness,  requirements  of third party guarantees,  maintenance of good
regulatory  standing  and, in certain circumstances,  the establishment  of offshore  and debt service
reserve accounts.  Violations of such provisions usually trigger contractual  penalties  or renegotia-
tion and might ultimately lead to default and court-supervised bankruptcy proceedings.
The ability to design and enforce  solid bond covenants  to protect the interest of bondhold-
ers  is  a  critical  factor for infrastructure  projects  located  in developing  countries  in tapping  off-
shore  markets  for  financing.  The  complexity  of  infrastructure  project  finance  transactions-
8involving multi-source  financing  structures, numerous public and private contracting  parties,  and
intricate contractual  arrangements and legal documentations,  compounded by the weakness  in the
legal  and  institutional  framework  to  protect  investors  interests-makes  this  task  a  challenging
one.
The  specific  covenants  included  in a particular  debt  agreement  and the  extent to  which
such covenants effectively serve to protect the interests of creditors depend inter alia on the nature
of the  debt instruments,  governing  law, and  the  .underpinning legal and  institutional frameworks
governing contract  formation  and  enforcement.  Given  that the writing,  negotiating, and monitor-
ing of specific  provisions are  costly,  two  sets of considerations  become  relevant:  the ease  with
which the stipulated covenants  can be monitored,  and the scope  for potential opportunistic behav-
ior that could lead to transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders.
More  generally,  investors  are  concerned  about the  availability  of legal recourse  that  de-
pends on the bond's terms  and the  quality of the legal  and institutional  environment in the host
country.  An  examination  of the project  bond covenants  in our sample reveals  that project  bond
indentures  contain  the  usual  covenant  provisions  aimed  at  mitigating  typical  shareholder-
bondholder  conflicts  such  as  asset  substitution,  dividend  policies,  claim  dilution,  and underin-
vestment  (Wamer and  Smith,  1997).  In the absence of sufficient contractual  protections,  the out-
come  is likely  to be  an inefficiently  low  investment,  often  referred  to  as the  under-investment
phenomenon  (Hart and Moore,  1988).
In addition,  they contain two further categories of clauses that arise  from the very specific
nature of project  finance.  Project  debt covenants  include incentive provisions for the contractors,
operators, and sponsors  such as performance targets, mandatory penalties, and minimal equity par-
ticipation  in the project.  They  also  contain  institutional environment provisions that,  in  case of
changes  in  the  ambient  regulatory,  legal,  or tax  environment,  trigger  change  of control  and/or
mandatory redemption of the debt that would assure bankruptcy  and operating disruptions  of the
project.  Akin to poison pills, such provisions  strengthen the position of (foreign) creditors  vis-a-
vis the host country and its policies.
From our  105  project bonds, we extract  a subsample of 27 bonds for which we have de-
tailed covenant information  from offering circulars, regulatory filings,  and rating analyses.  As the
9following  table shows,  the summary statistics  for the subsample mirror the financial  characteris-
tics of the full sample:
Characteristics  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.
Spread over US Treasuries  182  117  10  375
Amount*  319.49  193.51  180.00  800.00
Maturity (years)  **  10  3  5  18
Rating classification (average  of Moody's and S&P)***  BBB+/BBB  2 notches  BB  A+
(*) Ras Laffan issued the largest and AES China the smallest amount
(**) Ras Laffan has the longest and China Telecom the shortest maturity
(***)  CEZ Finance has the highest and Fideicomiso Petacalco with the lowest credit rating
Based on  a subsample of infrastructure-related, USD-denominated international bonds issued by projects in  5
emerging economies (Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Mexico,  the Philippines, and Qatar)  for which full covenant
information is available.
All project bonds in our sample are issued under New York Law.  This particular segment
of emerging market debt has often acted as an innovating force and contractual catalyst as the fol-
lowing  example shows.  While project bonds often contain collective action clauses  such as quali-
fied majority rules to limit inter-creditor conflicts  of interests,  comparable  sovereign-bond  inden-
tures issued under New York law typically did not have such provisions until recently.  However,
established  market practices  seem  to be changing  as  the Republic  of Mexico  recently  offered  a
global bond with a qualified  majority clause (February 2003)  followed by Brazil (April 2003).5 In
some  sense,  sovereign  borrowers  from  emerging  economies  follow  more  established  corporate
precedent in order to insure a better reception of the issue by investors.
A preliminary  analysis shows  that project covenant provisions differ widely in their strin-
gency.  The more projects  are removed from their sponsors  as measured by specific references  to
their limited-recourse  status (about 52 percent),  the more restrictive their covenants  tend to be.  As
stand-alone investments representing  a single source for cash flows, debtholders  require additional
assurance that cash  flows (and operations)  are not used to enhance shareholder value  to their det-
riment.
S  For more  on the Mexican  issue see Dailani and Kim,  "Mexico's  Collective  Action  Clause Bond,"  International
Finance Briefing Note 24, March  7,  2003,  The World Bank;  the Brazilian  issue is discussed in the International
Finance  Review,  May 2003.
10Category  Provision/Restriction  Type  Frequency
Project driven  Limited recourse status  52.31%
Limited recourse definition  28.57%
Collateral  33.33%
Fixed asset  14.28%
Receivables  38.09%
Off-shore trust account  28.57%
Intercreditor  Agreement  9.52%
Stakeholder  incentives  Capitalization  requirements  19.05%
Party-specific  equity stakes  19.05%
Performance-contingent  put provision  17.64%
Performance  targets, penalties  4.76%
Govemment incentives  Mandatory  redemption for concession  cancellation  23.80%
Redemption  for change in tax law or regulation  66.67%
Maintenance  of govemment  approval, regulatory  compliance  19.04%
Asset substitution  Put provision  9.52%
Contingent put provision  17.64%
Cost overrun  9.52%
Asset sale, lease-back  85.71%
Transactions with affiliated firms  23.80%
Counter-party restrictions  9.52%
Nature of business  42.85%
Use of funds  23.80%
Claim dilution  Additional indebtedness  73.68%
Lien limitations  100%
M&A restrictions  95.23%
Collateral value preservation  19.04%
Modification of indenture  85.71%
Reporting  requirements  80.95%
Maintenance  of insurance  33.33%
Equity conversion  5.00%
Permission of highly-leveraged  transactions  28.57%
Payments  Dividends,  debt-service coverage ratio restrictions  47.62%
Sinking fund  35.00%
Third-party guarantees,  debt service reserves  26.31%
Default definition  85.71%
Underinvestment  Call provisions  26.67%
Investment limitations  33.33%
Based on information extracted  from the offering documents (registration  filings, offering circulars, rating  studies) avail-
ablefor a subsample of 27 infrastructure-related,  USD-denominated international  bonds. The Frequency  column records
thefrequency of occurrence of the respective provision types in the bond covenants. In particular,  we classified  project-
bond covenant provisions into 45 broad categories  and seven instrument-specific  classes and attributed  for each bond in-
denture containing a particular  clause orfeature a 1, and 0 otherwise.
While all indentures  contain sensibly the same standard provisions aimed at preventing as-
set substitution,  claim dilution, cash payments,  and underinvestment,  two thirds of the bonds also
include project-specific stipulations. Most telling are minimal ownership requirements (19 percent
of covenants)  for  sponsors,  operators,  contractors,  and  off-takers.  Clearly,  such provisions  are
meant  to  align the  interests  of certain  stakeholders  crucial  to  the project's  commercial  success
11with debtholders.  Equity stakes  act as commitment  and incentive devices  for key players. Provi-
sions specifying remedies in case of cost overruns (24 percent of indentures), performance  targets
(5  percent),  capitalization  requirements  (19 percent),  and restrictions  on counter-parties  (10 per-
cent)  further protect the interests of debtholders.
A second  set of covenant  provisions  address  the  institutional  environment  and  possible
opportunistic behavior by regulators and host governments.  Roughly one quarter of indentures  (24
percent)  provide for mandatory debt redemption  in case of concession  cancellations  (a further  17
percent  offer optional  redemption  at the discretion of the bondholders  in case of completion,  fi-
nancing,  or operating problems).  Conversely,  22 percent of covenants  stipulate  that  the projects
are to maintain  government approval  and comply with all laws, rules, and regulations  applicable
to the project.  The objective is clear:  on the one hand, the project is not to give the host country
any reason to intervene.  On the other, mandatory  redemption in case of concession  cancellations
forces  the project  into  bankruptcy  so that the ensuing  disruption of service is meant to dissuade
the host country from unilateral regulatory  actions.  In the same vein,  77 percent of all indentures
require mandatory or optional early redemption  in case of changes in tax regulation.
IV. Determinants of Credit Spreads
The cost of international bond financing for infrastructure projects in emerging economies is a key
determinant  of their tariff structure and, hence,  economic  viability.  Our analysis of at-issue  credit
spreads of emerging market project bonds over US Treasuries  reveals how legal, regulatory, eco-
nomic, and financial  institutions in host countries influence  risk perceptions  and, hence,  the cost
of debt for infrastructure  development.  We find  that market risk perception in terms of at-issue
spreads over US Treasury bonds are a function of a project's contractual  structure  and its ambient
institutions.  Since it is nearly impossible to anticipate on all contingencies  in writing the contract,
and since parties might have  an incentive  for opportunistic  behavior, contracts are always  incom-
plete by their very nature and need to rely on other institutions for their execution.6 It emerges that
the quality of the ambient institutional environment is an important factor for market risk percep-
tions and the initial pricing of project bonds.
6 According  to the transaction-cost  approach, contract  incompleteness  is attributed to high transaction costs of writ-
ing,  negotiating  of contracts,  and  costs  associated  with  monitoring  contractual  performance;  see,  for  instance,
Joskow (1987,  1988), Hart (1988), and Aghion and Bolton (1992).
12In theory,  the  (second-best)  optimal  choice  of debt contracts  can mitigate  some of these
risks as long as investors can threaten the firm with a future cost that one could interpret as collat-
eral realization  (Diamond,  1984;  Gale and Hellwig,  1985; or Bolton and Scharfstein,  1990), with-
holding  of new  financing  (Gromb,  1999),  or liquidation  (Hart  and  Moore,  1994  and  1998).  In
practice,  the effectiveness of such covenant provisions critically hinges on the quality of the ambi-
ent legal institutions  required  to make the investors'  threat credible  and,  thus, the contract  self-
enforcing.  Hence, we would expect  pricing to be a function of the institutional environment  and
project attributes bonds in addition to the nature of their covenants.
The institutional, political,  and economic environment  feeds through to project-bond  pric-
ing through  the  market's  collective  assessment  of the issue's  systematic  and idiosyncratic  risks
and, hence, the premium that bondholders demand over comparable  default-free  sovereign bonds.
First  and  foremost,  investors  take into  account the  likelihood  of debtor  default  and recovery  in
bankruptcy.  In the context of project bonds, counter-party (off-take),  price, and demand risk drive
idiosyncratic  risk  perceptions,  while political,  macroeconomic,  and institutional  factors  such  as
definition  and enforcement  of property rights determine  the systematic ones. The institutional en-
vironment,  often overlooked or taken for granted by researchers  and practitioners  alike, is of par-
ticular  importance  as  it can mitigate or amplify the  degree to  which  counter-party  and political
risks feed  through to creditors.  Put differently,  deficiencies  in the institutional development  of a
host country might exacerbate  the market's  perception of counter-party  and other risk factors  in
pricing bonds. It also explains why project-rating  analyses pay particular  attention not only to the
project's contractual  structure but also to its ambient legal, regulatory, and political environment.
Traditionally,  empirical  studies of credit spreads have analyzed the dynamic  aspects rather
than  cross-sectional  ones  such  as  the  legal  and  institutional  factors  affecting  corporate  bonds
(Longstaff and  Schwartz,  1995  or Duffee,  1998),  reflecting  the  focus of much of the theoretical
work in this area.  However, recent work by Madan and Unal (2000) linking default rates to struc-
tural  factors  implies that  credit  spreads  are  linearly related to  firm-specific  and exogenous  vari-
ables.  In contrast the recent theoretical literature  (e.g., Duffie and Singleton,  1999), this approach
provides  a solid theoretical  foundation  for the nascent  empirical  literature  on the cross-sectional
determinants of credit spreads. Closest to our analysis are Elton et al. (2001)  who relate the cross-
sectional variation of US corporate  yield spreads to factors other than default expectations  such as
taxes and equity risk factors.  However, they do not study the impact of issuer-specific contractual
13and organizational  design factors  on credit spreads, nor the impact of institutional factors such as
the quality of legal, regulatory,  and political institutions.
In  analyzing  the  determinants  of (at-issue)  spreads  of project  bonds,  we  relate  project
credit spreads  over US  Treasuries to the relevant issue information  (amount, maturity,  rating),  a
set of variables  extracted from the bond's covenant provisions (seniority,  collateral, etc.), industry
indicator variables  (energy,  power, water,  etc.), factors  capturing  financial  and economic  aspects
of the underlying project,  a set of host country economic indicators (GDP, growth, etc.), and a set
of indices  measuring  a  host  country's  quality  of financial,  legal,  and political  institutions  in  a
cross-sectional  random-effect  regression  framework.  Tables  2  and  3  contain  detailed  summary
statistics  on our explanatory  variables while  table  5 describes  the institutional  variables in more
detail.
More  precisely,  we  estimate the  following  linear  cross-sectional  model  of project  credit
spreads by random country-effects regressions:
SPREAD; =flo +  ZI3k1SSUEki +  E  )kBCOVki  +  EflkljDS, +  E jkPROJ,.
I  k!￿K,  K,<k:5K,  K2 <k5K3  K,<k:5K4
+  N  Bk.  x+  INST.  +  /kBCOVV  INSTk, +V,  V, =e.. +u.
K 4<kSK,  5  K<k:K 6 K 6 <ktSK7
where  the  dependent variable  SPREAD is the  at-issue  spread over US Treasuries  of project i's
bond, ISSUE the relevant  issue information  (amount, maturity,  rating), BCOV a set of variables
the  bond's covenant provisions  (seniority,  collateral,  etc.),  IND industry indicator variables  (en-
ergy, power,  water,  etc.), PROJ  capturing  financial  and economic aspects of the underlying pro-
ject, x  a set of host countryj economic  indicators  (GDP,  growth,  etc.), INST indices  measuring
host country j's quality  of financial,  legal,  and political  institutions,  and the  last term  interacts
covenant  provisions  and institutional variables.  While table 4 in the Appendix  provides detailed
results of our empirical  analysis,  the following diagrams summarize  our findings  in terms of the
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Legal System  Regulation  Access  to Financing  Country Risk (ICRC)
Business  EnAironmnnt: Institutional Obstacles
Results from  cross-sectional regression analysis of the at-issue credit spreads of 105 international  project bonds from
emerging economies suppressing various control variables.  Institutional  variables derivedfrom the 1996/97 and 2000/01
Business Environment Surveys  conducted by the World Bank. The bars represent the effect  on credit spreads of an in-
crease by one category in an institution  perceived as an obstacle to business (e.g., goingfrom minor to moderate  obstacle)
with dark bars representing  variables  statistically  signifi  cant at the I percent or 5 percent level.
Among the institutional  variables,  legal and regulatory  obstacles  have the largest and sta-
tistically most significant  effect:  an  increase of 1 in the obstacle score for the judiciary increases
at-issue  spreads by  144 basis points  (bpts),  for the regulatory and tax  variable by 159  bpts (see
specification  1 in table 4).  Similarly, a  10 point increase  in the ICRG composite risk index  (e.g.,
from low to moderate country risk) increases project bond credit spreads by 150 bpts. Insufficient
financial development also widens at-issue spreads but the effect is not statistically significant:  the
recourse to global  debt market helps  to overcome  financing constraints that local firms typically
face  as an institutional impediment.  These findings underline the importance of the ambient  legal
framework  and institutional  development for access to external  financing,  first pointed out by La
Porta et al. (1997  and  1998).  Similarly, Modigliani  and Perrotti (1998)  argue that quality of legal
enforcement is a determinant of the form of debt borrowers choose.
Regarding  bond and project characteristics (specification  2 in table 4) it emerges that ma-
turity and credit ratings are two  very significant  determinants  of at-issue spreads:  one additional
year of maturity increases  spreads by 2 bpts. A decrease in project rating by one notch (e.g., from
BBB+  to BBB)  increases  spreads  by 31  bpts,  a  similar decrease  in the host country's  rating by
1524 bpts.  Since project  and  host country  ratings  often  go hand  in hand,  the combined  effect is  a
substantial  54 basis points.  These findings mirror the results  of King and Khang  (2002) who, in
their analysis of US  corporate  yield spreads,  establish similar rating effects  in addition  to typical
financial  determinants  such as leverage and free-cash  flow quality,  in themselves factors  affecting
credit ratings.
Spread Detenninants:  Bond Temns
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In terms of project type, water and transportation  projects  come to the market  at,  respec-
tively,  135  and 233  bpts  higher than  other projects.  A possible  explanation  might lie in the fact
that these two  types of projects are particularly vulnerable in terms of asset-specificity,  unilateral
redefinition of property rights, and demand risk.
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The  analysis  suggests  that  covenant protection  and,  more  generally,  contractual  devices
alone are insufficient  to overcome shortcomings  in the host country's legal, financial, and political
institutions.  Investors, through their pricing behavior,  take into account the quality of the ambient
institutional environment.  Given the very specific  nature of the assets, the scope for opportunistic
behavior  and the  concentrated  nature  of economic  and  financial  risk inherent  in project  finance,
well-functioning  legal, economic,  and political institutions provide better investor protection  than
bond covenants. Bondholders,  in turn, reward projects  located in host countries that adhere to the
rule  of law  with tighter  credit  spreads  and,  hence,  lower  funding  costs.  Instead,  covenants  can
serve as incentive devices to all stakeholders  in a project including host governments  and regula-
tors. Built around easily understood and enforced standard provisions, they include provisions that
make it very costly for local parties-government  and  direct stakeholders-to enhance  their own
stakes in the project to the detriment of bondholders.
Our findings mirror the results of Elton et al. (2001) who  show for a sample of US corpo-
rate  bonds  that  expected  default  accounts  for a  surprisingly small  fraction  of the  credit  spread.
While tax effects explain  a substantial portion of the spread, the authors find that factors explain-
ing risk premia for common stock also drive credit spreads.
V.  Discussion  and Conclusion
This note highlights  several important  characteristics of international project bond markets.  It pro-
vides an empirical perspective on typical project-bond  covenant provisions on the basis of a sam-
17ple of project-related  fixed income securities  issued in international  capital markets  from January
1993  to March 2002. Furthermore, we complement  the discussion of covenant provisions with an
analysis of the degree  to which the level of institutional  development of the projects'  host coun-
tries matters for the pricing of the bonds.
We find that fixed income investors price both the contractual design of the actual debt se-
curity and  its ambient  institutional  environment.  As a more  detailed  analysis  of typical  project-
bond covenants reveals, issuers anticipate concerns by lenders that arise from the particular nature
of infrastructure  projects,  i.e.,  the  assets'  location  specificity,  threat  of renegotiation,  unilateral
regulatory changes, and unilateral redefinition of property rights. At the same time, covenants  also
strive to implement  managerial incentives  for owners  and operators of project that, hitherto, was
thought of as falling into the domain of shareholders. Hence,  we conclude that bondholders play a
much more active  role in the design  and  governance  of project bonds  than  is the  case for tradi-
tional corporate bonds.
Our  analysis also  shows  that  one cannot  view the contractual  arrangements  of project  in
isolation  from the ambient legal and regulatory environment.  Controlling for economic  and finan-
cial development of the host country,  we find that the level of institutional development and,  es-
pecially,  proxies for the rule of law significantly affect market  risk perceptions  and project-bond
pricing.  This  find  is hardly surprising  in  light of our covenant  analysis.  In the last consequence,
private contracting-rarely  able to specify a complete contract-needs  to rely on host-country le-
gal institutions to enforce local provisions, contracts and property rights. Hence, two conclusions
emerge.  First,  private  contractual  arrangements  and  ambient  legal  institutions  are complements
rather than substitutes.  Second, investing in building appropriate institutions can decrease  the cost
of infrastructure development beyond their immediate  benefits for society at large.
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20APPENDIX
Table  1
Project Bonds Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of various attributes  of the global project bonds represented
in our sample that are primarily drawn from emerging economies by issue type.
Moody's
Type  N  Spread  Amount  Maturity  Rating
Emerging economies  105  297.80  278.07  11.82  Baa3
Latin America  56  333.64  233.40  10.46  Baa3
Asia  43  251.94  322.91  13.38  Baa3
Europe  3  208.33  200  7.33  Baa3
Middle-East and North Africa  2  162.5  600  13.77  A3
Africa  1  802.17  396.825  30  Baal
Fixed rate  98  296.43  287.14  12.27  Baa2
Variable rate  7  316.96  171.86  5.52  A3
Senior  94  293.11  289.75  12.5  Baa3
Secured  34  343.46  237.20  12.4  Bal
Unsecured  62  276.10  307.98  11.69  Baa2
Asset-backed  42  312.07  248.73  12.30  Baa2
Chemical  1  227.30  250.00  22  Baa3
Energy  39  312.60  322.42  11.4  Baal
Power  38  254.50  227.90  13.1  Baal
Telecom  12  310.40  286.67  9.01  Baa2
Transmission  6  359.80  181.50  8.36  Baal
Transport  9  432.20  321.20  13.1  Bal
Water  4  418.50  192.88  9.86  Ba2
Other  3  230.20  201.17  8.95  Bal
21Table 2
Economic Indicators and Institutional Environment
The country variables  are  1995-1999  averages  where per  capita  GDP  is real  GDP per capita  in
USD, Inflation log difference of the consumer price index, Growth the GDP growth rate in current
USD,  and  Financing,  Legal,  and Corruption  Obstacle  are  summary business  environment  vari-
ables  from firm responses to the World Business Environment  Survey (WBES). They take integer
values 1 to 4, with higher values indicating greater obstacles.  Firm variables  are averaged  over all
firms in each country. The last table provides more detailed variable definitions  and explanations.
ICRG
Corruption
Country  GDP per capita  Inflation  Growth  Credit Rating  Composite  Financing Obst.  Legal Obst.  Obst.
Argentina  7990  0.06  1  Ba3/BI  73.21  2.990  2.327  2.622
Brazil  4486  16.07  .8  B2  65.19  2.692  2.543  2.490
Chile  5001  5.97  4.4  Baal  78.42  2.410  1.990  1.867
China  677  4.74  7.6  A3  73.42  3.347  1.564  2.031
Colombia  2383  16.67  -0.6  Baa3  60.74  2.640  2.370  2.780
Czech  Republic  5170  7.37  1.6  Al  79.79  3.136  2.126  2.136
Dominican  Republic  1742  7.11  5.2  BI  69.89  2.640  2.482  2.936
Hong Kong  22619  3.75  0  A3  80.08  1.859  1.323  1.250
India  414  8.32  4.6  Bal  66.82  2.548  2.011  2.797
Indonesia  1044  17.56  0  B3  60.69  2.860  2.198  2.630
Korea  11480  4.29  3.8  Baa2  78.51  2.291  1.905  2.161
Malaysia  4539  3.40  2.6  Al  76.53  2.316  1.685  1.852
Mexico  3395  21.70  1.4  Ba2  68.55  3.192  2.835  3.327
Panama  3124  0.98  1.6  Baal  69.45  2.101  2.474  2.859
Philippines  127  7.45  1.4  Bal  69.91  2.680  2.283  3.110
Qatar  3.58  Bal  70.05  2.915  1.659  3.149
Russia  2222  49.40  -I  Ba2  59.99  3.210  2.130  2.553
South Africa  3936  7.07  0.6  Baa3  72.75  2.382  . 2.598
Thailand  2839  4.83  1  A2  73.16  3.112  2.125  3.471
Venezuela  3483  41.55  -1.2  Ba3  65.73  2.566  2.719  3.031
22Table 3
Summary Statistics and Correlations
Summary statistics are presented in Panel A and correlations  are presented in Panel B. N refers  to
the number of bonds, countries, or WBES  firm-level observations for the 20 countries represented
in our sample.  GDP, Inflation,  Growth,  and  Financing,  Legal, and Corruption  Constraints  are  as
previously  defined.  The various other  financing,  legal,  and  corruption  variables  are average  re-
sponses by firms to the WBES questionnaire.  Higher numbers indicate greater obstacles, with the
exception of "Firms have to make 'additional payments'  to get things done" and "Firms know the
amount of 'additional  payments'  in advance".  Detailed variable definitions  and  sources  are con-
tained in the last table.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable  Label  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Spread over US Treasuries  SPREAD  105  297.80  173.81  10  802.172
Amountissued  AMOUNT  105  278.07  201.62  23  1000
Maturity (years)  MAT  105  11.82  10.5  2.97  100
Creditrating index  CRI  105  8.57  3.22  0  14
Country creditrating  index  CCRI  105  9.06  3 notches  Al  B3
Inflation  [NF  105  11.96  11.39  .61  49.40
GDPpercapita  GDPCAP  105  3905.42  3397.53  414  22618.60
GDP (million $)  GDP  105  280.3  266.05  8.8  870.2
Economic  growth  GROWTH  105  2.15  2.40  -1.2  7.6
Infrastructure  development  INFRA  105  2.21  0.38  1.35  3.23
Financing  FINANCE  105  2.79  0.38  1.86  3.35
Exchange rate  FXRATE  105  2.65  0.65  1.38  3.63
Quality of Legal  Institutions  LEGAL  105  2.19  0.50  0  2.84
Corruption  CORRUPT  105  2.60  0.60  1.25  3.47
Taxes &  regulation  TREG  105  2.76  0.60  1.50  3.61
Policy instability and uncertainty  POLINST  105  2.86  0.57  1.47  3.64
23Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Key Variables
Spread  CCRI  Infrastruct.  Taxes & Amount  Maturity  CRI  GDP($)  GDP/capita  Growth  Inflation  Financing  FX Rate  Legal  Reg.  Corruption
Amount  -0.23
Maturity  -0.15  -0.01
CRI  0 46  -0.05  -0.07
CCRI  0.47  -0.30  -0.14  0.08
GDP($)  0.41  -0.11  -0.19  -0.03  0.29
GDP/cap  -0.03  0.13  -0.11  -0.06  -0.07  -0.11
Growth  -0.31  0.14  0.03  -0.14  -0.32  0.14  -0.05
Inflation  -0.04  -0.08  0.19  0.02  0.41  -0.12  -0.20  -0.26
Infrastructure  0.27  . -0.28  0.06  0.21  0.38  -0.09  -0.47  -0.45  0.40
Financing  0.33  -0.26  -0.21  -0.11  0.31  0.58  -0.16  -0.13  0.12  0.29
FXRate  0.25  -0.17  0.02  0.17  0.44  -0.11  -0.33  -0.45  0.57  0.79  0.24
Legal Obst.  0.33  -0.26  -0.03  -0.01  0.78  0.09  -0.20  -0.39  0.63  0.53  0.43  0.66
Taxes &  Reg.  0.46  -0.28  -0.20  0.01  0.79  0.21  0.01  -0.51  0.33  0.51  0.52  0.60  0.76
Corruption  0.32  -0.28  0.02  0.00  0.63  0.07  -0.37  -0.42  0.54  0.80  0 54  0.75  0.86  0.69
Policy  Inst.  0.35  -0.32  -0.09  -0.03  0.80  0.16  -0.17  -0.55  0 63  0.60  0.45  0.71  0.88  0.87  0.81
24Table 4
Economic  and Institutional Determinants of Project Bond Spreads
SPREAD, =o  +  Z/3ISSUE.+  1fIBCOV,+  +  >/J  PROJA,
I5k:K,  K, <k!1X,  K,<k5K,  K 3.<k5K,
+  EI AXAI+  E  3kINSTkJ+  EPkBCOV-.INST4j+vi,,  vj= ej  +u
Kl<k!K,  KX,<kK6,  K,<kgK,
where the dependent variable SPREAD is the project bond's at-issue spread  over US Treasuries,
ISSUE the relevant issue information (amount,  maturity, rating), BCOV the bond's covenant pro-
visions (seniority,  collateral,  etc.), fND industryiindicator  variables  (energy,  power, water,  etc.),
PROJ a set of variables capturing  financial and economic  aspects  of the underlying  project, x a
set of host countryj economic indicators  (GDP, growth,  etc.), INST indices measuring host coun-
tryj's quality of financial, legal and political institutions, and the last terrn an interactive one.
Specification  1  2
Constant  234.2358  Constant  -254.5744
(0.3147)  (0.0318)
Economic  indicators:  Econonic indictors:
GDP in USD mnillions  0.0689  Country credit rating  -39.4783
(0.3873j  (0.2219)
Growth  -5.8360  Issue terms:
(0.1662)  Issue credit rating  31.6986
Institutional obstacles:  (0.0000)
Financing constraints  87.5000  Amount  -0.0008
(0.1238)  (0.9891)
Legal obstacles  144.0655  Maturity  2.0267
(0.0333)  (0.0535)
Change in legal confidence  -142.9761  Secured  -39.4783
(0.2310)  (0.2219)
Policy instability  -321.8449  Unsecured  -61.1755
(0.0000)  (0.0722)
Taxes and regulation  159.8684  Assej-backed  49.5075
(0.0311)  (0.2011)
ICRG composite  risk index  18.4925  Guaranteed  24.7833
(0.0000)  (0.0219)














Adjusted R 2 0.46  0.54
Observations  105  103
No. of countries  20  20
26Table 5
Variable Definitions  and Data Sources
The following table summarized  our explanatory variables  in terms of definition and origin. To-
gether with our data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators  (WDI), it contains all
variables extracted from the World Business Environment Survey.(WBES)  and, in particular,  the
relevant underlying questions and possible  answer choices in the firm survey.
Variable  Label  Definition  Source
Economic Indicators
GDP  GDP  GDP in current U.S. dollars, observed in bond's issue year  WDI
GDP per capita  GDPCAP  Real per capita GDP, observed in bond's issue year  WDI
Country Credit Rating  CCRI  Index of host-country credit rating (average of Moody's and S&P)
Index
Credit Rating Index  CRI  Index of issue's credit rating (average  of Moody's and S&P)
Growth  GROWTH  Growth rate of GDP, observed in bond's issue year  WDI
Inflation rate  INFLAT  Log difference of Consumer Price Index,  observed in bond's issue  WDI
year
ICRG Corruption Index ICRGCORR International  Country Risk Group index of host-country corruption  PRS
(rescaled: higher values correspond to more corruption)  Group
ICRG Composite Index ICRGCOMP International  Country Risk Group index of host-country political,  PRS
economic and financial risk (rescaled: higher values correspond  to  Group
higher risk)
Major Environment Categories
Each fu-m was  asked to select three major business impediments out
of 12 broad categories  to which the following variables belong.
Financing  Obstacle  FIN  How problematic  is financing  for the operation and growth of your  WBES
business:  no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle
(3) or a major obstacle (4)?
Legal Obstacle  LEGAL  How problematic is functioning of the judiciary  for the operation  WBES
and growth of your business: no  obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a
moderate obstacle (3)  or a major obstacle (4)?
Change  in Legal Confi-  DLEG  Difference in reply over three years to: I am confident that the legal  WBES
dence  system will uphold my contract and property rights in business dis-
putes:  (1) fully agree,  (2) agree in most cases, (3)  tend to agree,  (4)
tend to disagree, (5) disagree  in most cases, (6) fully disagree
Taxes and Regulation  TREG  How problematic  are taxes and regulations  for the operation and  WBES
Obstacle  growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a
moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?
Political Instability  POLITI  How problematic  is political instability  for the operation and growth WBES
Obstacle  of your business: no obstacle  (1),  a minor obstacle (2), a moderate
obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?
Corruption  Obstacle  CORR  How problematic is corruption for the operation and growth of your WBES
business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate  obstacle
(3)  or a major obstacle (4)?
27Variable  Label  Definition  Source
Infrastructure  Obstacle  INFRA  How problematic  is infrastructure  for the operation and growth of  WBES
your business: no obstacle  (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate ob-
stacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?
Exchange Rate Obsta-  FXRATE  How problemnatic  are exchange rates for the operation and growth of  WBES
cle  your business: no obstacle  (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate ob-
stacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?
28Table 6
Project Bonds
The following table provides a detailed overview  of our sample by reporting each bond's
issue terns and legal structure.  The infornation comes from the issue  documentation and
third  sources  such as Bloomberg,  IDC, and Thomson Financial  Securities Data. Country
refers to the host-country, the Maturity is the project bond's time to redemption  in years,
the At-issue Spread the bond's yield spread over maturity-matched  US  Treasury  securi-
ties,  the Host-Country Spread the  sovereign  spread of the  country's EMBI  Global  (JP




Issue  Ma-  Amoun  Sprea  try
Country  Project  Sector  Date  turity  t  d  Spread  Ratings  Structure
ARGENTINA  CAPEX S.A.  9-Jan-98  6.40  105.00  324.62  559  BB  Senior, Un-
Power  5  secured
ARGENTINA  Ernpresa Distri-  14-Aug-  5.00  125.00  246.37  689  BBB-  Senior, Un-
buidora de Ener-  98  5  secured
gia Norte  S.A.  Power
ARGENTINA  Inversora Elec-  24-Sep-97  5.00  100.00  266  314  BB+  Pari passu,
trica de Buenos  Asset
Aires S.A.  Power  Backed
ARGENTINA  Inversora Elec-  24-Sep-97  7.00  130.00  292  314  BB+  Pari passu,
trica de Buenos  Asset
Aires  S.A.  Power  Backed
ARGENTINA  Metrogas S.A.  27-Mar-  3.00  350.00  353  517  BI  Senior,  Se-
Power  00  cured
ARGENTINA  Transportadora  27-Jun-97  7.00  24.00  211.89  344  BBB-  Senior, Un-
de Gas del Norte  I  secured
S.A. (TGN)  Energy
ARGENTINA  Transportadora  25-Jul-00  12.00  175.00  486.92  620  BBB-  Senior, Un-
de Gas  del Norte  6  secured
S.A. (TGN)  Energy
ARGENTINA  Transportadora  25-Apr-00  3.00  150.00  423  638  Bl  Senior, Un-
de Gas del Sur  secured
S.A. (TGS)  Energy
BRAZIL  Companhia  26-Sep-00  8.00  200.00  662  659  B2  Senior, Se-
Petrolifera Mar-  cured
lirn  Energy
BRAZIL  Cornpanhia  17-Dec-99  5.00  200.00  715  567  B2  Senior,  Se-
Petrolifera  Mar-  cured
Iim  Energy
BRAZIL  Eletrobras  -Cen-  27-Jun-96  8.00  250.00  338  681  B+  Senior, Un-
trais Eletricas  secured
Brasileiras S.A.  Power
BRAZIL  Eletrobras - Cen-  9-Jun-00  5.00  300.00  568  650  B+  Senior, Un-
trais Eletricas  secured
Brasileiras  S.A.  Power
BRAZIL  Espirito  Santo  28-Jul-97  10.00  500.00  387.5  323  BI  Senior, Un-
Centrais Eletri-  secured
cas S.A.  Power
29At-  Host-
issue  Coun-
Issue  Ma-  Amoun  Sprea  try
Country  Project  Sector  Date  turity  t  d  Spread  Ratings  Structure
BRAZIL  LIGHT- Servicos  13-Oct-00  5.00  23.00  403.5  697  BI  Pari-Passu,
de Eletricidade  Unsecured
S.A.  Power
CHILE  Chilgener S.A.  26-Jan-96  10.00  200.00  99  793  Baal  Senior, Un-
Power  secured
CHILE  EDELNOR  S.A.  27-Mar-  10.00  250.00  148.96  836  Baal  Senior, Un-
Power  96  7  secured
CHILE  Ernpresa Electri-  2-Apr-98  7.00  90.00  480  450  Baal  Senior, Un-
ca del Norte  secured
Grande S.A.  Power
CHILE  Empresa Electri-  29-Apr-96  7.00  80.00  143.99  729  Baa3  Senior,  Se-
ca Guacolda S.A.  Power  2  cured
CHILE  Empresa Electri-  2-May-96  7.00  170.00  90  741  Baal  Senior, Un-
ca Pehuenche  secured
S.A.  Power
CHILE  Enersis S.A.  26-Nov-  10.00  300.00  82  498  Baal  Senior, Un-
Power  96  secured
CHILE  SCL Terminal  22-Dec-98  13.53  213.00  237.5  953  Baa2  Senior,  Se-
Aereo Santiago  cured &
S.A.  Trans-  Asset
port  Backed
CHILE  Telefonica CTC  25-Jul-96  10.00  200.00  83  700  Baal  Senior, Un-
Chile S.A.  Telecom  secured
CHILE  Telefonica CTC  8-Jan-99  7.00  200.00  350  931  Baal  Senior, Un-
Chile  S.A.  Telecom  secured
CHINA  AES China Gen-  19-Dec-96  10.00  180.00  375  479  Ba3  Senior, Un-
erating Co. Ltd.  Power  secured
CHINA  Cathay Intema-  Trans-  15-Apr-98  10.00  350.00  745  440  Ba3  Senior, Un-
tional Limited  port  secured
CHINA  China Mobile  2-Nov-99  5.00  600.00  190  712  A3/BB  Senior, Un-
(Hong Kong)  B  secured
Ltd.  Telecom
CHINA  China Telecom  31 -Oct-00  5.00  690.00  240  657  Baa2  Senior, Un-
(Hong Kong)  secured
Ltd.  Telecom
CHINA  GH Water Sup-  22-Dec-00  10.00  400.00  194.66  741  Ba3  Senior,  Se-
ply [Holdings]  7  cured &
Limited  Asset
Water  Backed
CHINA  Guangzhou-  1  1-Aug-  7.00  200.00  375  313  Ba3  Senior, Un-
Shenzhen  Super-  97  secured
highway (Hold-  Trans-
ings) Ltd.  port
CHINA  Guangzhou-  Il-Aug-  10.00  400.00  412.5  313  Ba3  Senior,  Un-
Shenzhen Super-  97  secured
highway (Hold-  Trans-
ings) Ltd  port
30At-  Host-
issue  Coun-
Issue  Ma-  Amoun  Sprea  try
Country  Project  Sector  Date  turity  t  d  Spread  Ratings  Structure
CHINA  Huaneng Power  21-Nov-  6.50  230.00  10  473  BBB  Senior, Un-
International  Inc.  Energy  97  secured
CHINA  Suzhou Devel-  7-Oct-97  15.00  103.50  237.74  297  Ba3  Pari-Passu,
opment Trust  8  Asset
Backed
Other  Guaranteed
CHINA  Zhuhai Highway  Trans-  7-Aug-96  10.00  85.00  250  655  Baa3  Senior, Un-
Co.  port  secured
CHINA  Zhuhai Highway  Trans-  7-Aug-96  12.00  115.00  475  655  Baa3  Senior, Un-
Co.  port  secured
COLOMBIA  Oil Purchase  I  1-May-  5.00  175.60  532.89  698  Ba2  Senior Se-
Company II  99  6  cured &
Asset
Energy  Backed
COLOMBIA  Oleoducto Cen-  28-Jun-95  10.00  150.00  324.62  1109  Baa3  Senior Se-
tral S.A.  Trans-  4  cured &
mission  Guaranteed
COLOMBIA  TermoEmcali  16-Apr-97  17.68  165.00  300.01  435  Senior,  Se-
Funding Corp.  Power  3  cured
COLOMBIA  TransGas  de  Trans-  10-Nov-  15.00  240.00  359.42  1187  Baa3  Senior,  Se-
Occidente S.A.  mission  95  9  cured
COLOMBIA  Transtel  28-Oct-97  10.00  150.00  651.94  468  B2  Senior,  Se-
Telecom  4  cured
CZECH REP.  Aero Vodochody  17-Nov-  7.00  200.00  280  920  Baal  Senior, Un-








DOMINICAN  Tricom  21-Aug-  7.00  200.00  510  314  B2  Senior, Un-
REP.  97  secured &
Asset
Telecom  Backed
HONG KONG  Kowloon Canton  Trans-  16-Mar-  10.00  1000.00  168  530  A3  Senior, Un-
Railway Corp.  port  00  secured
HONG KONG  New World In-  24-Mar-  5.00  300.00  173  434  Ba3  Senior, Un-
frastructure  Lim-  98  secured
ited  Other
INDIA  Tata Electric  12-Aug-  10.00  150.00  160  309  Baa3  Senior, Un-
Companies (The)  Power  97  secured
INDIA  Tata Electric  12-Aug-  20.00  150.00  193  309  Baa3  Senior, Un-
Companies (The)  Power  97  secured
INDONESIA  DSPL Finance  28-Aug-  14.35  150.00  219.32  617  Baa3  Senior, Se-







Issue  Ma-  Amoun  Sprea  try
Country  Project  Sector  Date  turity  t  d  Spread  Ratings  Structure
KOREA  Korea Electric  31-Mar-  5.00  300.00  190  556  Bal  Senior,  Un-
Power Corp.  Power  00  secured
MALAYSIA  Petroliam Na-  1-Jul-93  10.00  500.00  98  405  A2  Senior, Un-
sional Berhard  Energy  secured
MALAYSIA  Petroliam Na-  17-Aug-  10.00  375.00  69  1056  Al  Senior,  Un-
sional Berhard  Energy  95  secured
MALAYSIA  Petroliam Na-  17-Aug-  20.00  625.00  86  1056  Al  Senior, Un-
sional Berhard  Energy  95  secured
MALAYSIA  Petroliam Na-  18-Oct-96  10.00  800.00  57  536  Al  Senior, Un-
sional Berhard  Energy  secured
MALAYSIA  Petroliam Na-  12-Aug-  5.00  650.00  320  844  Baa3  Senior, Un-
sional Berhard  Energy  99  secured
MALAYSIA  Telekom Malay-  10-Aug-  10.00  200.00  72  1022  Al  Senior, Un-
sia  Telecom  95  secured
MALAYSIA  Telekom Malay-  3-Aug-95  10.00  300.00  102  1071  Al  Senior,  Un-
sia  Telecom  secured
MALAYSIA  Tenaga Nasional  22-Jun-94  10.00  600.00  89  874  A2  Senior, Un-
Berhad  Power  secured
MALAYSIA  Tenaga Nasional  31-Oct-95  30.00  350.00  121.90  1124  Al  Senior, Un-
Berhad  Power  6  secured
MALAYSIA  Tenaga Nasional  16-Jan-96  100.0  150.00  155.40  866  Al  Senior, Un-
Berhad  Power  0  6  secured
MALAYSIA  Tenaga Nasional  29-Apr-97  10.00  300.00  42  407  Al  Senior, Un-
Berhad  Power  secured
MALAYSIA  Tenaga Nasional  29-Apr-97  10.00  500.00  73  407  Al  Senior, Un-
Berhad  Power  secured
MALAYSIA  Tenaga Nasional  4-Apr-01  10.00  600.00  295  753  Baa3  Senior, Un-
Berhad  Power  secured
MEXICO  Conproca  S.A.  30-Jun-98  12.00  370.30  653  598  Ba2  Senior, Se-
De C.V  cured &
Asset
Energy  Backed
MEXICO  El Habal Fun-  17-Jun-98  13.00  60.00  471.95  540  Ba2  Senior,  Se-
ding Trust  6  cured &
Asset
Power  Backed
MEXICO  Fideicomiso Pe-  23-Apr-97  13.00  308.90  325  421  Ba2  Senior,  Se-




MEXICO  Monterrey  Po-  24-Apr-98  11.57  235.54  400  445  Ba2  Senior,  Se-
wer, S.A. de  cured &
C.V.  Asset
Power  Backed





Issue  Ma-  Amoun  Sprea  try
Country  Project  Sector  Date  turity  t  d  Spread  Ratings  Structure
MEXICO  Pemex Finance  14-Dec-98  8.42  350.00  350  1027  Baal  Pari-Passu
Asset
Energy  Backed
MEXICO  Pemex Finance  25-Feb-99  8.00  200.00  362.5  961  Baal  Pari-Passu
Asset
Energy  Backed
MEXICO  Pemex Finance  25-Feb-99  11.73  200.00  400  961  Baal  Pari-Passu
Asset
Energy  Backed
MEXICO  Pemex Finance  25-Feb-99  5.00  300.00  115  961  Aaa  Pari-Passu
Asset
Energy  Backed




















MEXICO  Pemex Finance  10-Feb-00  13.00  150.00  150  532  Aaa  Senior, As-
Energy  set Backed
MEXICO  Pemex Finance  10-Feb-00  11.00  800.00  275  532  Baal  Senior,  As-
Energy  set Backed
MEXICO  Pemex Finance  12-Feb-01  7.00  1000.00  360  674  Baal  Senior, Un-
secured As-
Energy  set Backed
MEXICO  Pemopro S.A. de  26-Oct-99  3.35  161.00  455.25  708  Bal  Senior,  Se-
C.V.  cured Gu-
Energy  ranteed
MEXICO  Proyectos de  14-May-  5.00  100.00  405.41  479  Ba2  Senior,  Se-
Energia,  S.A. de  98  9  cured &
C.V.  Asset
Power  Backed
PANAMA  PYCSA Panama  6-Oct-97  15.00  131.00  425  299  Ba3  Senior, Un-




Issue  Ma-  Amoun  Sprea  try
Country  Project  Sector  Date  turity  t  d  Spread  Ratings  Structure
PHILIPPINES  Bauang Private  28-Mar-  12.00  85.00  366.14  850  Ba2  Senior,  Se-




PHILIPPINES  CE Casecnan  21-Nov-  *7.00  75.00  337.10  1140  Ba2  Senior, Se-
Water and En-  Wa-  95  9  cured &
ergy Co.  Inc.  ter&Ener  Asset
gy  Backed
PHILIPPINES  CE Casecnan  27-Nov-  10.00  125.00  556.83  1125  Ba2  Senior,  Se-
Water and En-  Wa-  95  2  cured &
ergy Co.  Inc.  ter&Ener  Asset
gy  Backed
PHILIPPINES  CE Casecnan  27-Nov-  15.00  171.50  585.34  1125  Ba2  Senior,  Se-
Water and En-  Wa-  95  5  cured &
ergy Co. Inc.  ter&Ener  Asset
gy  Backed
PHILIPPINES  Globe Telecom  27-Mar-  10.00  200.00  442  487  Ba3  Senior, Un-
Telecom  02  secured
PHILIPPINES  Globe Telecom  6-Aug-99  10.00  220.00  709  872  Bl  Senior, Un-
Telecom  secured
PHILIPPINES  National  Power  13-Dec-96  10.00  200.00  167  492  Ba2  Senior, Un-
Corp.  secured &
Asset
Power  Backed
PHILIPPINES  National Power  13-Dec-96  20.00  160.00  190  492  Ba2  Senior, Un-
Corp.  secured &
Asset
Power  Backed
PHILIPPINES  National Power  6-May-98  30.00  300.00  386.5  460  Bal  Senior, Un-
Corp.  secured &
Asset
Power  Backed
PHILIPPINES  Quezon Power  3-Jul-97  10.00  215.00  245  330  Bal  Senior,  Se-
(Philippines)  cured
Ltd.  Power
QATAR  Ras Laffan Liq-  12-Dec-96  10.00  400.00  137.5  498  A3  Senior, Se-
uefied Natural  cured
Gas Co. Ltd.  Energy
QATAR  Ras Laffan Liq-  12-Dec-96  18.00  800.00  187.5  498  A3  Senior,  Se-
uefied Natural  cured
Gas Co. Ltd.  Energy
RUSSIA  Mosenergo, AO  9-Oct-97  5.00  200.00  250  305  BB-  Senior, Un-
Power  secured
SOUTH  Transnet Ltd.  17-Apr-98  30.00  396.82  802.17  447  Baal  Senior, Un-
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THAILAND  Jasmine Subma-  29-May-  14.00  180.00  175  354  Baal  Senior,  Se-
rine Telecom-  97  cured &
munications co.  Asset
Ltd  Telecom  Backed
THAILAND  Total Access  4-Nov-96  10.00  300.00  200  519  BB-  Senior, Un-
CommunicatiOns  Telecom  secured
VENEZUELA  Cerro Negro  18-Jun-98  11.46  200.00  180  560  Baal  Senior, Se-
Finance  Ltd.  cured &
Asset
Energy  Backed
VENEZUELA  Cerro Negro  18-Jun-98  22.47  350.00  225  560  Baal  Senior,  Se-
Finance  Ltd.  cured &
Asset
Energy  Backed
VENEZUELA  Cerro Negro  18-Jun-98  30.00  50.00  237.5  560  Baal  Senior,  Se-




VENEZUELA  Fertinitro Finan-  21-Apr-98  22.00  250.00  227.31  442  Baa3  Senior,  Se-
ce Inc.  Chemical  7  cured
VENEZUELA  Petrozuata Fi-  27-Jun-97  12.00  300.00  120  344  Baal  Senior,  Se-
nance Inc. or  cured &
Petrolera Zuata  Asset
Backed
Energy  Guaranteed
VENEZUELA  Petrozuata Fi-  27-Jun-97  20.00  625.00  145  344  Baal  Senior, Se-
nance Inc. or  cured &
Petrolera Zuata  Asset
Energy  Backed
VENEZUELA  Petrozuata Fi-  27-Jun-97  25.00  75.00  160  344  Baal  Senior,  Se-
nance Inc. or  cured &
Petrolera Zuata  Asset
Energy  Backed
35Policy Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS3071  Survey Techniques to  Measure and  Ritva Reinikka  June 2003  H.  Sladovich
Explain  Corruption  Jakob Svensson  37698
WPS3072  Diversity Matters:  The Economic  Somik V.  Lall  June 2003  V.  Soukhanov
Geography of Industry  Location in  Jun  Koo  35721
India  Sanjoy Chakravorty
WPS3073  Metropolitan  Industrial Clusters:  Sanjoy Chakravorty  June 2003  V. Soukanov
Patterns and Processes  Jun Koo  35721
Somik  V.  Lall
WPS3074  The Gender Impact of Pension  Estelle James  June 2003  M. Ponglumjeak
Reform:  A Cross-Country Analysis  Alejandra Cox Edwards  31060
Rebeca Wong
WPS3075  Child Labor,  Income  Shocks, and  Kathleen Beegle  June 2003  E.  de Castro
Access to Credit  Rajeev H. Dehejia  89121
Roberta  Gatti
WPS3076  Trade  Reform  in Vietnam:  Philippe Auffret  June 2003  K.  Tomlinson
Opportunities with  Emerging  Challenges  39763
WPS3077  Do More  Transparent Governments  Roumeen  Islam  June 2003  R.  Islam
Govern Better?  32628
WPS3078  Regional Integration  in East Asia:  Eisuke Sakakibara  June 2003  S.  Yusuf
Challenges  and Opportunities-  Sharon Yamakawa  82339
Part l: History and Institutions
WPS3079  Regional Integration  in  East Asia:  Eisuke Sakakibara  June 2003  S. Yusuf
Challenges and Opportunities-  Sharon Yamakawa  82339
Part II: Trade,  Finance,  and  Integration
WPS3080  Can  Fiscal Rules Help Reduce  Guillermo Perry  June 2003  R.  lzquierdo
Macroeconomic Volatility in the  Latin  84161
America  and Caribbean  Region?
WPS3081  The Anatomy of a Multiple Crisis:  Guillermo Perry  June 2003  R. Izquierdo
Why was Argentina Special and  Luis Serv6n  84161
What  Can  We Learn from  It?
WPS3082  Financial Dollarization and  Central  Kevin Cowan  June 2003  Q. Do
Bank Credibility  Quy-Toan  Do  34813
WPS3083  Mine Closure  and its Impact on the  Michael Haney  June 2003  L. Marquez
Community:  Five Years after Mine  Maria  Shkaratan  36578
Closure in  Romania,  Russia, and Ukraine
WPS3084  Major Trade Trends  in  East Asia:  Francis Ng  June 2003  P.  Flewitt
What are their Implications for  Alexander Yeats  32724
Regional Cooperation  and Growth?
WPS3085  Export  Profiles of Small Landlocked  Francis Ng  June 2003  P.  Flewitt
Countries: A Case Study Focusing  Alexander Yeats  32724
on their Implications for Lesotho
WPS3086  Intertemporal  Excess Burden,  Derek Hung Chiat  Chen  June 2003  D. Chen
Bequest  Motives, and the Budget Deficit  81602Policy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS3087  Gender, Generations, and Nonfarm  M.  Shahe  Emran  June 2003  P. Kokila
Participation  Misuzu Otsuka  33716
Forhad  Shilpi
WPS3088  U.S.  Contingent Protection against  Julio J. Nogues  June 2003  P. Flewitt
Honey Imports:  Development Aspects  32724
and the Doha Round
WPS3089  The "Glass  of Milk"  Subsidy Program  David Stifel  June 2003  H.  Sladovich
and Malnutrition  in Peru  Harold Alderman  37698
WPS3090  The Cotonou  Agreement and its  Manuel  de la Rocha  June 2003  F. Sy
Implications for the Regional Trade  89750
Agenda in Eastern  and Southern Africa
WPS3091  Labor Market Policies and  Pierre-Richard Agenor  July 2003  M. Gosiengfiao
Unemployment in Morocco:  Karim  El Aynaoui  33363
A Quantitative Analysis
WPS3092  The  Integrated Macroeconomic Model  Pierre-Richard  Agenor  July 2003  M. Gosiengfiao
for Poverty Analysis:  A Quantitative  Alejandro  lzquierdo  33363
Macroeconomic  Framework for the  Hippolyte Fofack
Analysis of Poverty  Reduction Strategies
WPS3093  Migration  and Human Capital in  Norbert M. Fiess  July 2003  R. lzquierdo
Brazil during the  1990s  Dorte Verner  84161
WPS3094  Oil, Agriculture, and the Public  Norbert M. Fiess  July 2003  R. lzquierdo
Sector: Linking Intersector Dynamics  Dorte Verner  84161
in Ecuador